The Legal Structure of Ring-Fenced Bodies in the United Kingdom - A Response to Consultation Paper CP19/14 on the Implementation of Ring-fencing: on Legal Structure, Governance and the continuity of Services and Facilities by Heine, K. (Klaus) & Cedeno-Brea, E.
The Legal Structure of Ring-Fenced 
Bodies in the United Kingdom 
 
A Response to Consultation Paper CP19/14 on the 
Implementation of Ring-fencing: on Legal Structure, 
Governance and the continuity of Services and Facilities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presented by 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Heine 
heine@law.eur.nl  
 
 
Enmanuel Cedeño-Brea 
Enmanuel.cedenobrea@edle-phd.eu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 January 2015 
CONTENT  
 
1. OVERVIEW 3 
2. ON THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF RFBS 4 
3. RESOLVABILITY AND LEGAL STRUCTURE 6 
4. COULD RING-FENCING COMPLICATE SUPERVISION? 8 
1. Overview  
 
1.1 This paper is submitted by Prof. Dr. Klaus Heine1 and Enmanuel Cedeño-Brea2, in 
response to the Prudential Regulatory Authority’s (PRA) Consultation Paper CP19/14 
on “The Implementation of Ring-fencing: consultation on legal structure, governance 
and the continuity of services and facilities”, published on October 2014 (hereinafter, 
the “Consultation Paper” or “CP19/14”).   
 
1.2 This response addresses some of the issues presented in CP19/14. In particular, 
it focuses on questions surrounding the legal structure of ring-fenced bodies (RFBs) 
in the United Kingdom (as discussed in chapter 2 and also Appendix 1 of CP19/14). 
However, some of the concerns discussed in this paper are also relevant for the 
governance of RFBs (chapter 3), as well as for the continuity of services and facilities 
within banking groups (chapter 4).  
 
1.3 This response is comprised of three additional sections. The second section, on 
the legal structure of RFBs, discusses that the legal organisation of the individual 
entities within bank groups is important for financial stability, resilience and 
resolvability. A third section suggests some aspects of group legal structure that could 
be further explored by the PRA in order to enhance resolvability. A final section 
questions whether ring-fencing could complicate—rather than simplify, financial 
supervision for home and host state supervisors.    
                                                        
1 Professor of Law and Economics at the Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam. Jean Monnet Chair of 
Economic Analysis of European Law and research fellow at the European Research Centre for 
Economic and Financial Governance (EURO-CEFG), Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
2 Doctoral candidate (PhD) within the framework of the European Doctorate in Law and Economics 
(EDLE), University of Hamburg, University of Bologna and Erasmus University Rotterdam. PhD 
Associate at the European Research Centre for Economic and Financial Governance (EURO-CEFG). 
Master of Laws (LLM) in Banking Law and Financial Regulation, London School of Economics (2008). 
Master of Science (MSc) in Law and Finance, Queen Mary, University London (2012).  
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2. On the Legal Structure of RFBs 
 
2.1 CP19/14 and its proposed “Draft supervisory statement on ring-fenced bodies: 
legal structure”, focus on group structure, rather than on the legal structure of RFBs 
and other affiliate entities within a banking group. This is referred to in the 
Consultation Paper as the “group ownership structure” of banking groups in the UK. In 
addition to this group-focus, the PRA has also adopted an “outcome” or “proportionate 
approach” to structural and organisational issues. The legal structure of banking 
groups certainly is very important for enhancing resilience and resolvability. 
However, it is argued in this section that the legal and ownership aspects of 
individual firms (e.g. RFBs and other entities within a group) could also provide 
some benefits for making RFBs— and their banking groups— more resilient and 
resolvable.  
  
2.2 Some of the legal aspects of bank organisation have gained prominence after the 
onslaught of the financial crisis. A plethora of structural proposals for bank reform 
have mushroomed across leading jurisdictions, such as: the United States of America 
(US), Germany, France, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK). The 
rising complexity of these legal and organisational issues is somewhat recognized in 
section 1.16. of the CP19/14, which states that the PRA will take a proportionate 
approach to legal structure: “(…) given the heterogeneous nature of the firms to which 
ring-fencing requirements will apply (…) [and] In recognition of firms’ specific 
characteristics, the differing impact of the policy proposals across firms and whether 
the particular element of the requirement delivers the policy outcome in each case (…)”.  
 
2.3 The legal structure of financial and banking groups has become increasingly large, 
complex and diverse. Banking groups in the UK —and in other leading financial 
centres—are often comprised of many different, interconnected legal entities 
incorporated and operating across borders. Moreover, credit institutions can also be 
legally organised through a wide gamut of legal forms—ranging from corporations, 
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different types of mutual societies and cooperatives, and even non-profit entities. It 
is often the case that different legal rules apply to existing organisational forms across 
jurisdictions.  
 
2.4 The legal forms that credit institutions adopt are important because each 
organisational form has precise combinations of legal attributes and regulations. 
Some of these attributes include limited liability, having a stand-alone legal 
personality, rules regarding residual ownership (or risk bearing) and corporate 
governance. Consequently, legal forms determine the underpinning ownership and 
governance structure for firms—including banks. Put another way, legal structures 
create patterns of creditors’ rights (or risk/loss bearing patterns) for individual 
financial institutions, their banking groups and their stakeholders. These ownership 
patterns (property rights) can also be construed as incentives arrangements for 
different bank stakeholders, such as: depositors, residual owners and taxpayers. The 
aforementioned incentives are important throughout the life of a bank—but even 
more so, during times of financial distress and leading up to resolution.  
 
2.5 The ownership patterns that arise from bank legal structures also interact with 
deposit guarantee schemes. Depositor protection is another fundamental aspect that 
the PRA is calibrating alongside the legal structure of RFBs and banking groups under 
the present consultation process.3 Like legal and organisational structure, depositor 
protection arrangements also modify existing patterns of ownership rights. This 
means that both legal structure and deposit protection schemes can exert different 
—and maybe even conflicting— incentives to bank stakeholders.  
 
2.6 Because of the importance that bank organisational structures have on 
stakeholders’ rights, it could be advisable for the PRA to probe deeper into the 
granularity of legal forms for individual entities within a banking group. This would 
                                                        
3 Consultation Paper CP20/14 on “Depositor Protection” was also published on October 2014 as part 
of the Ring-Fencing Consultation.  
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imply going further than the expected “sibling structure” and examining which legal 
forms—if any— would be better suited to either: minimize the likelihood and costs 
of bank failure on taxpayers, or enhance the orderly resolvability of failing banks with 
minimum disruptions to the payments system and financial stability. There might be 
a trade-off which cannot be easily overcome. In its current form, the ring-fencing 
reform would purportedly only apply to certain large credit institutions—mainly 
corporations— with deposits of over GBP 25 Billion. Other important organisational 
forms that credit institutions take, such as mutual societies (building societies, 
friendly societies, industrial provident societies and EEA mutual societies) are 
excluded from the scope of the proposed rules.   
 
2.7 In conclusion, we recommend that the PRA should consider the legal structure of 
individual entities within banking groups—and not only the group structure itself. 
This could entail designing and proposing more specific, detailed and prescriptive 
rules for the legal organisation of RFBs and other non-core entities in the UK. Delving 
into the underpinnings of legal organisational forms could also shed some light into 
the existence of the structures that could enhance bank resolvability and resilience, 
minimise the external costs of bank failure and achieve greater overall financial 
stability. As a result, we regard more detailed ex ante rules as more effective to reach 
the conceived goals than the introduction of standards that have to be legally 
interpreted ex post. 
3. Resolvability and Legal Structure  
 
3.1 As stated in the previous section, both the group and the individual structure of 
banks are important for achieving resilience, resolvability and financial stability. 
However, the way that individual entities within a financial group are legally setup 
can have an effect on systemic risk containment and resolvability on a consolidated 
basis. This section argues that in addition to the adoption of the recommended 
“sibling structure”, the PRA should also consider how the legal attributes of RFBs 
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established as stand-alone subsidiaries could facilitate (or obstruct) group 
resolvability in the event of failure or distress.  
 
3.2 The ring-fencing proposal aims to protect deposits and other core activities by 
spinning off such activities into separate legal entities. While the PRA has not 
prescribed a specific form for organising RFBs, it is likely that such entities will be 
structured as corporations. Limited liability (also called “owner shielding”) and legal 
personality (“entity shielding”) are two of the flagship attributes that corporations 
have. These attributes have been recognized in the academic literature to have 
important legal and economic consequences. 
 
3.3 Establishing RFBs as standalone legal entities implies that their assets would be 
shielded from the failure of other group entities. This is one of the objectives that bank 
ring-fencing purports to achieve. However, limited liability could hinder this 
objective in the event of the insolvency or financial distress of a RFB.  Limited liability 
implies that holding companies do not have an obligation to capitalize RFBs in the 
event that the later fail. Instead, the proposed rules intend to enhance resolvability 
by promoting bail-ins at the group level. Insofar it might be advisable to think in more 
depth about an effective way of “piercing the veil” in case of financial distress of a RFB. 
 
3.4 In addition to the adoption of the “sibling structure” and bail-in at group level, the 
proposed rules for enhancing the resolvability of both banking groups and RFBs could 
benefit from: (a) requiring holding companies to act as a “source of strength” to their 
RFBs 4 ; (b) corporate veil-piercing and legal personality piercing for holding 
companies and other affiliate entities within a banking group. In the event of 
insolvency or financial distress of RFBs, this approach would allow regulators and 
                                                        
4 Following the US model, as originally established in § 225.28 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1957 and Regulation “Y”. “Source of strength” is interpreted to mean: “The ability of a company that 
directly or indirectly owns or controls an insured depository institution to provide financial assistance to 
such insured depository institution in the event of the financial distress of the insured depository 
institution”.  
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supervisors to tap into capital and liquidity available in other parts of the groups 
structure—not only limited to the UK holding company. In addition, having the option 
to pierce the corporate veil will already set a strong incentive for a proper behaviour 
of holding companies. 
4. Could Ring-fencing Complicate Supervision? 
 
4.1 Could Ring-fencing complicate— rather than simplify, group structure? In turn, 
could it make supervision more difficult for both home and host state supervisors? 
This section argues that the proposed rules could generate difficulties for financial 
supervisors. Such complications include moral hazard and coordination problems.   
 
4.2 Ring-fencing through subsidiarisation is likely to increase the number of legal 
entities under supervision in the UK. Many cross-border banking groups already have 
convoluted and multilayered legal and organisational structures. Adding additional entities 
into the mix could increase supervisory challenges and exacerbate information 
asymmetries.  
 
4.3 The argument that ring-fencing could make supervision more difficult challenges 
the idea, presented in the Vickers Report, that: “removing the complexity of some 
wholesale/investment banking would make it easier for ring-fenced banks to be 
managed, monitored and supervised”. 5  According to the Vickers Report, the 
simplification process would purportedly also enhance resolvability. However, by 
increasing the number of supervisees, oversight could be diffused, becoming 
ineffective when and where it matters the most. Consequently, opportunities for 
malfeasance and human error could proliferate. Taking this into account underpins 
the argument for clear and detailed ex ante rules instead of the application of 
standards that have to be adapted to special cases ex post. 
                                                        
5 Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report, p. 46.  
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4.4 Moreover, Ring-fencing coupled with deposit protection insurance schemes can 
potentially generate moral hazard and biases for bank regulators. Regulators and 
supervisors could become overconfident by trusting that—thanks to a combination 
of ring-fencing and deposit protection insurance schemes— depositors will not lose 
their money and taxpayers would not need to bailout banks in the event of failure. 
This can lead to the reduction of oversight efforts. Ring-fencing could also give 
supervisors an illusion of having greater control over RFBs, motivating them to 
concentrate more efforts in the supervision of ring-fenced entities, while losing sight 
of other—often riskier— trading entities within a banking group, that fall outside of 
the fence. 
 
4.5 The moral hazard problem discussed before could also generate coordination 
problems between home and host state supervisors. In particular, coordination 
problems can arise when the host state that adopts deposit ring-fencing is also the 
home state of important financial groups that conduct activities abroad. This is the 
case of the UK—a global banking powerhouse— with the potential to export 
externalities overseas. Four British banks are currently in the Financial Stability 
Board’s (FSB) 2013 list of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs).  
 
4.6 If home states for large banking groups, like the UK, reduce the monitoring efforts of 
their own banking groups in order to concentrate on supervising their local RFBs, 
coordination problems could ensue. For example, host states to British could experience 
heightened coordination problems, information asymmetries, and potential negative 
externalities locally. Moreover, host states to British G-SIBs could also feel inclined to 
enter a race-to-the-top by adopting similar deposit ring-fencing measures in an attempt to 
protect their local depositors and mitigate the potential importation of negative externalities 
from operations abroad. Should more financial supervisors focus their oversight on 
protecting local deposits, a larger—and riskier part of bank activities could be left 
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unsupervised. Thus, the dynamics of the proposed regulation should be taken into account, 
especially for the background of regulatory competition.   
 
